Introducing Patient Scope of Care: Psychologists, Psychiatrists, and the Privilege to Prescribe Drugs by Berland, Rachel P.
Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy 
Volume 6 
Issue 2 Health Reform: The Act, Decision and 
Election 
Article 11 
2013 
Introducing Patient Scope of Care: Psychologists, Psychiatrists, 
and the Privilege to Prescribe Drugs 
Rachel P. Berland 
rberland@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rachel P. Berland, Introducing Patient Scope of Care: Psychologists, Psychiatrists, and the Privilege to 
Prescribe Drugs, 6 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol6/iss2/11 
This Student Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship 
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
425 
INTRODUCING PATIENT SCOPE OF CARE: PSYCHOLOGISTS, 
PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE PRIVILEGE TO PRESCRIBE DRUGS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
States regulate healthcare through their police power to protect the 
public’s health and welfare.1 To achieve this end, policymakers enact state 
healthcare laws in pursuit of improving quality, increasing access, and 
controlling the costs of healthcare services for patients.2 Doctors have 
historically played an active role in the development of state licensure and 
scope of practice laws, resulting in a highly self-regulated profession.3 This, 
coupled with legislators’ limited expertise in the area of healthcare, forces 
state actors to rely on healthcare professionals in legal decision-making.4 
The healthcare professionals are motivated by self-interests and fight to 
dictate what constitutes quality, access, and cost in an effort to advance 
underlying professional biases.5 Thus, the debate over scope of practice is 
framed exclusively from the healthcare professionals’ perspectives and 
reduces to boundary drawing and line pushing.6 This framework fails to 
consider an essential factor, what I am describing as “scope of care,” 
defined as the range of treatments available to the public from the patient’s 
point of view.7 This missing perspective raises concerns about whether the 
existing structure of the debates can realize the intended healthcare policy 
goals of protecting the public’s health and welfare.8 
The history of midwifery exemplifies the importance of considering the 
patient’s scope of care in healthcare professionals’ scope of practice policy 
 
 1. Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including Alternative and Complimentary 
Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 87 (1996). 
 2. John F. Hoadley, Health Care in the United States: Access, Costs, and Quality, 20 
POL. SCI. & POL. 197, 197 (1987). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ 
Scope of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 304-05 (2002). 
 5. Patrick M. Callahan, Power Allocations and Professional Hierarchy in the Illinois 
Health Care System, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 217, 219, 224, 229 (2010). 
 6. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 331. 
 7. See infra Part III. “Scope of care” is a concept I developed after researching the 
history of midwifery and scope of practice law. 
 8. See Lisa E. Bartra, Comment, Reconsidering the Regulation of Health Professionals in 
Kansas, KAN J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1996, at 155, 155. 
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debates.9 Obstetricians successfully framed their territorial claim to childbirth 
in terms of quality, claiming midwives’ practice threatened the safety of the 
mother and child.10 Policymakers failed to consider how the long-term effect 
of the change in practice would narrow patients’ scope of care, resulting in 
a public demand for the revitalization of midwifery.11 
The current debate over expanding psychologists’ scope of practice to 
include the authority to prescribe psychotropic drugs (RxP) involves a similar 
aspect of turf control. The debate is framed from the perspectives of self-
interested actors, including psychologists, psychiatrists, and professional 
organizations.12 Proponents of RxP, who have much to gain financially with 
expanded scope of practice,13 frame their arguments in terms of increased 
access to mental health treatment and improved quality.14 Opponents, 
motivated by territorial incentive to protect their exclusive power to practice 
medicine and economic stature from infringing psychologists,15 define their 
position in terms of concerns for quality and patient safety.16 
What seems to be missing from both sides is consideration of the long-
term effect of such regulation on the patient’s scope of care.17 By applying 
insights gained from the history of midwifery, state legislatures will learn that 
RxP may not realize the quality, access, and cost policy goals championed 
by proponents.18 Rather, RxP will cost patients much more than currently 
considered in terms of the models of care available, the identity of 
psychology, and the standards required to obtain prescriber status.19 It will 
diminish quality and reduce access to care, narrowing the scope of care 
available to mental health patients.20 
 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. Sarah Anne Stover, Note, Born by the Woman, Caught by the Midwife: The Case for 
Legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery in All Fifty States, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 307, 315 (2011). 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. Steven C. Hayes et al., Prescription Privileges for Psychologists: Constituencies and 
Conflicts, 58 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 697, 705 (2002). 
 14. Letter from Katherine Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice, Am. Psychological Ass’n, 
to Senator Delbert Scott, Senator Jane Cunningham, Mo. Senate Fin. & Governmental Org. 
and Elections Comm. 3, 5 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://apadivision55.intuitwebsites. 
com/APAPDTestimony.pdf. 
 15. See, e.g., Safriet, supra note 4, at 309. 
 16. See, e.g., Daniel Mamah, Psychologist Prescribing Bill Introduced Again in 2009, E. 
MO. PSYCHIATRY, 1st Q., 2009, at 1, 9, available at http://missouri.psych.org/news/Docu 
ments/20091stQuarterNewsletter.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Nordal, supra note 14; Mamah, supra note 16, at 9. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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In this comment, I discuss the importance of adding the “scope of care” 
factor to the scope of practice debate regarding RxP, paying particular 
attention to Missouri laws. My intent is to contribute another element to 
recurring scope of practice debates that considers the scope of care 
available to the patient. The comment begins by reviewing doctors’ 
involvement in the history of licensure and scope of practice laws, which is 
characterized by the omission of patient scope of care from legal decision-
making.21 In Part III, I offer the legal history of midwifery as an historic 
example of how licensure and scope of practice laws can narrow patient 
scope of care and result in public demand for a re-broadened scope of 
care. With this frame in place, Part IV addresses the current debate over 
psychologists’ privilege to prescribe. The scope of practice debate centers 
on issues of access, quality, and cost, but it omits from consideration the 
long-term effects on scope of care.22 In Part V, I apply insights gained from 
the history of midwifery to conclude that legislatures should deny 
psychologists the authority to prescribe. The long-term effects of granting 
psychologists the authority to prescribe on mental health treatment will result 
in a narrowed patient scope of care, and hence, an undermining of the 
needs of the very patients these debates are purported to serve. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF LICENSURE AND SCOPE OF PRACTICE LAWS 
States regulate healthcare professionals’ licensure and scope of practice 
laws under their Tenth Amendment23 police power to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of their citizens.24 These laws typically regulate 
healthcare professionals by defining the particular practice of the specific 
profession,25 establishing licensing boards for various professions,26 
delegating regulatory functions to the board,27 limiting the defined practices 
of the qualified people who carry a particular title,28 and restricting the use 
of the defined practices to that profession, as well as the use of the 
professional title.29 Any legislative decision modifying licensure and scope of 
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part IV.B. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 24. Cohen, supra note 1, at 87. 
 25. Safriet, supra note 4, at 306. 
 26. Bartra, supra note 8, at 158. Allied professions are sometimes regulated by the 
dominant profession’s board. Id. at 158-59. 
 27. Id. at 158. Such functions include the authority to decide specific education and 
training necessary to satisfy the statutory requirements, prepare and administer the 
examinations required by the statute, and set standards of practice for the profession. Id. 
 28. Safriet, supra note 4, at 306. 
 29. Id.; Bartra, supra note 8, at 156. 
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practice laws has the potential to result in an “overall negative or positive 
outcome for patients.”30 
Doctors’ involvement in establishing physician licensure laws and their 
continuously active presence has played an essential role in how healthcare 
professional licensure and scope of practice laws developed into their 
current existence.31 Since the earliest laws, doctors have claimed the 
practice of medicine as their exclusive turf, forcing other healthcare 
professionals to define a distinct space for themselves to seek legal 
professional protection.32 This boundary drawing and line pushing between 
various healthcare professionals positions them against one another and 
invites them to dominate scope of practice debates.33 Driven by self-
interests, doctors and other healthcare professionals play tug of war, 
framing their arguments in terms of improving quality, increasing access, 
and controlling costs of healthcare.34 This framework addresses concerns 
that dominate media coverage and attract legislative decision-makers’ 
attention.35 It also creates an approach to scope of practice laws that relies 
on the professionals’ perspectives and requires the public to place 
confidence in healthcare professionals to act in their best interest.36 It leaves 
little room for consideration of how setting boundaries and redrawing lines 
affects the patient’s scope of care, which should be the state’s ultimate focus 
in its regulation.37 
A. History of Licensure Laws: The Doctor’s Role 
Medical doctors led the initial efforts to enact licensure laws in the 
United States as a protectionist measure against untrained practitioners.38 
The profession consisted of two types of medical professionals: practicing 
clinical doctors and doctors who were in charge of medical schools and 
licensure boards.39 In the mid-1700s, medical doctors sought to distinguish 
themselves from other professionals by attending medical school and 
drawing a legally-defined boundary between themselves and the threat of 
 
 30. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 115 (6th ed. 
2008). 
 31. Randall G. Holcombe, Eliminating Scope of Practice and Licensing Laws to Improve 
Health Care, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 240 (2003). 
 32. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 306. 
 33. Callahan, supra note 5, at 219. 
 34. Id. at 229; see FURROW ET AL., supra note 30, at 115. 
 35. Safriet, supra note 4, at 302. 
 36. David M. Mirvis, Physicians’ Autonomy – The Relation Between Public and 
Professional Expectations, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1346, 1347 (1993). 
 37. See infra note 65. 
 38. Holcombe, supra note 31, at 240-41. 
 39. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44 (1982). 
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quackery through licensure laws.40 Initially, the two sects of doctors’ 
purposes were split in their crusade for licensure laws, but both groups had 
“immediate interests” in legal protection.41 
Practicing clinical doctors sought to keep the profession restricted to 
assert their elite status, while doctors in charge of medical schools and 
licensing board doctors conspired to expand the profession to maximize 
financial gains from licensing the highest number of people.42 Neither type 
of doctor held the ultimate authority, making effective regulation 
impossible.43 Through the early 1800s, doctors’ self-interested attempts to 
define boundaries that distinguished the medical profession based on 
medical school graduates versus nongraduates, licensed versus unlicensed 
professionals, and medical society members versus nonmembers proved 
ineffective.44 These differences in professional interests faded as physicians 
as a whole began to realize the need to assert a collective interest in 
distinguishing themselves from untrained practitioners.45 
Although physicians organized into a unified interest group seeking legal 
protection, their attempts to establish exclusive privileges in the mid-1800s 
were met by public disdain.46 The public saw licensure laws as contradictory 
of democratic ideals of accessibility and universality of medicine.47 Doctors 
posited they “feared the danger quacks and pretenders posed to the 
innocent public” while skeptics trusted the “good sense of the public” to 
make its own choices in seeking medical care.48 In response to public 
opposition, state governments rescinded several of the initial licensure laws 
doctors had worked to put in place.49 
Over time, the medical profession established itself as a science-based 
profession, and the public began to accept both the complexity of medical 
 
 40. Id. at 41, 44, 45. 
 41. See id. at 45. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. STARR, supra note 39, at 46. 
 45. See id. at 45. 
 46. Id. at 57-58. 
 47. Id. at 59. In the 1830s and 1840s, Jacksonian ideology made abolishing licensing 
professionals a high priority as the public came to see licensing as an artificial distinction 
expressing “favor rather than competence.” Id. at 58. With the decline in medical licensing, 
physicians and irregular practitioners created societies to distinguish themselves from one 
another. Id. Physicians defined the “issue” as science versus quackery, framing it as a danger 
irregulars posed to the innocent public, while irregulars saw the problem in terms of free 
competition versus monopoly, arguing that the public was able to be free to make its own 
health care choices. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. STARR, supra note 39, at 58. 
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science and the limitation of lay competence.50 By the 1870s and 1880s, 
science changed the context in which medicine was understood, and various 
sectarian physicians were able to unite successfully to protect themselves 
and the public against external, unqualified, competing practitioners.51 The 
public accepted the resurgence of licensure laws and viewed them as 
protection from corporate interests that were coming to dominate American 
economics.52 
In affirming the public perception that “few can judge of the 
qualifications of learning and skill, which . . . [the doctor] possesses,” the 
Supreme Court confirmed states’ power to regulate in the area of healthcare 
licensure and scope of practice.53 The Court emphasized the importance of 
drawing the distinction between those who are qualified to practice 
medicine and those who are not in order to protect public safety.54 In the 
1889 Dent v. West Virginia case, the Supreme Court upheld a West Virginia 
statute requiring every doctor to obtain a medical degree from a reputable 
school and pass an examination.55 The Court found that “the power of the 
state to provide for the general welfare of its people” authorized West 
Virginia to prescribe regulations aimed at securing its citizens against 
ignorance and incapacity. It also found the interest to be particularly 
compelling in the area of medicine.56 Thus, the Supreme Court made clear 
that under the Tenth Amendment power to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens, states could regulate the healthcare profession 
through licensing and scope of practice laws.57 
Since then, doctors have legally controlled the practice of medicine as 
exclusively theirs58 and have dictated the way medicine is practiced within a 
state through state medical boards.59 Under Missouri law, it is “unlawful for 
any person not now a registered physician within the meaning of the law to 
 
 50. Id. at 59. 
 51. Id. at 102. 
 52. Id. at 103. Licensure law had become part of the resistance of independent 
professionals and small business to corporate America. Id. 
 53. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889). 
 54. Id. at 123. 
 55. Id. at 115, 128. These two requirements have become the standard minimum for 
most states’ medical licensure. STARR, supra note 39, at 104. In Dent, the West Virginia board 
of health refused to license Frank Dent as a medical doctor based on a state statute because 
he attended the American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, a university that “did not 
come under the word ‘reputable.’” Dent, 129 U.S. at 118. Dent challenged the statute and 
lost. Id. at 128. 
 56. Dent, 129 U.S. at 122-23. 
 57. Stover, supra note 10, at 321-22. 
 58. Safriet, supra note 4, at 307. 
 59. Callahan, supra note 5, at 220. 
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practice medicine.”60 The Missouri Board of Healing Arts holds the 
tremendous power to deny, revoke, suspend, and reinstate a medical 
professional’s medical license.61 The Board is composed of nine members, 
eight of whom are “duly licensed and registered as physicians and surgeons 
pursuant to the laws of th[e] state.”62 The resulting “primacy” of the medical 
profession has enabled doctors to obtain the strategic position of control 
over healthcare institutions and non-physician healthcare professionals.63 
Healthcare providers who are deemed subordinate to physicians have 
faced few obstacles in obtaining professional licensure protection,64 while 
healthcare providers who have not been perceived as inferior but, rather, as 
external to and separate from doctors’ practices have faced challenges in 
their efforts to acquire legal recognition and protection of their profession 
through licensure laws.65 Such external professionals have been forced to 
carve out a piece of doctors’ domain and define and re-define their 
practices as distinct from the practice of medicine.66 Today, as technology 
advances,67 education and training become more sophisticated, and skills 
grow, healthcare professionals increasingly seek expanded scopes of 
practice under state law.68 The implications of legally altering a professional 
group’s scope of practice affect the relative status and dominion of various 
healthcare professionals.69 Therefore, those healthcare professionals who 
are likely to be affected by scope of practice changes launch campaigns 
 
 60. MO. REV. STAT. § 334.010 (2000). 
 61. Id. § 334.100. 
 62. Id. § 334.120. The ninth member is a “voting public member, to be appointed by the 
governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate.” Id. 
 63. Callahan, supra note 5, at 220-21; see, e.g., STARR, supra note 39, at 221 (outlining 
an example of doctors maintaining their superiority in the profession despite medical advances 
allowing less trained individuals from providing treatment). 
 64. STARR, supra note 39, at 223. Because subordinate professional institutions 
developed under the aegis of physicians, health care occupations that are subordinate to 
doctors’ positions did not pose as great a threat to doctors’ exclusive control of the practice of 
medicine. Id. Thus, nurse midwives, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants faced little 
resistance in achieving licensure protection and scope of practice authorization because these 
professionals practice directly under the supervision and authority of medical doctors. See id.; 
see also MO. REV. STAT. § 334.104. 
 65. Safriet, supra note 4, at 308-09. Health care professionals have to defend their 
abilities to perform tasks safely from attacks by medical doctors who seek to defend their 
territory. Id. Throughout history, lay medical practitioners have “been either absorbed into the 
medical profession, like botanic medicine, or kept on the margins, like osteopathy and 
chiropractic.” STARR, supra note 39, at 48. Lay practice is an “extension of domestic care into 
the community.” Id. 
 66. Safriet, supra note 4, at 308-09; Bartra, supra note 8, at 156. 
 67. Callahan, supra note 5, at 219. 
 68. Safriet, supra note 4, at 308-09. 
 69. Callahan, supra note 5, at 224. 
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ostensibly to protect the public welfare but that actually advance self-
interests, many times at the expense of the public.70 The public voice that 
was concerned with protecting the citizen’s voice and right of choice in 
medical treatment options in the mid-1800s has been swallowed by the 
current patchwork of licensure and scope of practice laws71 that focus on 
boundary drawing and line pushing.72 
B. Framing Scope of Practice Legal Debates 
The debates over licensure and scope of practice laws center on 
healthcare policy considerations of access, quality, and cost from the 
professionals’ points of view.73 While the primary purpose of state regulation 
is to protect against uninformed decision-making that could result in harm 
to the patient,74 this policy goal has been “eclipsed by a tacit goal of 
protecting the professions’ economic prerogatives.”75 In an effort to protect 
their exclusive turf of practicing medicine,76 doctors argue that healthcare 
providers seeking expanded scopes of practice are not properly trained and, 
therefore, pose a risk to patient safety and threaten healthcare quality.77 
Non-medical healthcare professionals argue expanded scope of practice 
would increase access by creating more providers and ultimately reduce 
costs to patients by offering the same services at lower fees.78 Both sides act 
to protect their own self-interests and fight to define what best protects the 
public’s welfare,79 resulting in professional agencies “bitterly scrambling for 
control.”80 
Legal scholars and reformers have raised fundamental concerns about 
the dominant role healthcare providers play in the debate, arguing that it 
has frustrated the realization of ultimate healthcare policy goals of 
improving quality, increasing access, and controlling costs to protect the 
 
 70. Id. at 224-25. 
 71. Bartra, supra note 8, at 155. 
 72. Id. at 156; see Safriet, supra note 4, at 308. 
 73. Callahan, supra note 5, at 219. 
 74. Bartra, supra note 8, at 161. 
 75. PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM’N, TASKFORCE ON HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 
REGULATION, STRENGTHENING CONSUMER PROTECTION: PRIORITIES FOR HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 
REGULATION 2 (1998). “Self interest on the part of the regulated professions, rather than public 
safety, can be the driving force behind regulations.” Bartra, supra note 8, at 155. 
 76. Safriet, supra note 4, at 302. 
 77. Id. at 310. 
 78. Callahan, supra note 5, at 232. 
 79. Compare Mamah, supra note 16, at 1, 9 (arguing that RxP puts patients at risk and, 
thus, does not protect the public welfare), with Nordal, supra note 14, at 1 (positing that RxP 
would increase access to mental health treatment and, thus, serves the public’s best interest). 
 80. Callahan, supra note 5, at 218. 
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public’s welfare.81 Critics of current licensure and scope of practice laws 
believe the laws act as a barrier to entry to protect professionals’ statuses 
instead of an assurance of quality care for the patient.82 They maintain that 
licensure and scope of practice laws have evolved into a system that is static 
and incapable of accommodating change.83 Reformers question medical 
professionals’ true interests and seek to limit the autonomy and power 
doctors hold in legal decision-making about professional licensure and 
scope of practice.84 Others advocate for a fresh approach to licensure and 
scope of practice laws that is both the product of rational development and 
replaces the existing patchwork of licensure provisions that fail to create a 
comprehensive policy to achieve ultimate policy goals.85 
Licensure and scope of practice debates focus on the perspective of the 
healthcare professionals and omit consideration of the long-term effects on 
the patient’s scope of care. State actors’ primary purpose is to “establish 
standards that protect consumers from incompetent practitioners.”86 These 
laws dictate that state legislatures should settle scope of practice debates by 
enabling all professionals capable of providing a particular practice with 
quality care to have the practice incorporated into their scope of practice.87 
Skeptics question whether this paternalistic approach can actually achieve 
best outcomes.88 Critics find the idea that healthcare consumers need state 
protection from untrained practitioners reinforces questionable assumptions 
of patient inability to evaluate the quality of medical care89 and places too 
 
 81. The process of defining scope of practice is “both imperfect, and continuous.” Id. at 
219. At one extreme, Holcombe posits that licensure and scope of practice laws are 
“unnecessary” because they “raise the cost of health care and lower its quality.” Holcombe, 
supra note 31, at 236. 
 82. Holcombe, supra note 31, at 244; Bartra, supra note 26, at 155. 
 83. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 309. 
 84. STARR, supra note 39, at 390-91. However, much of the autonomy and power that 
inheres in being a physician is reinforced through the licensing system that reproduces 
authority through the generations and disperses it to individual members of the profession. Id. 
at 19. 
 85. Bartra, supra note 8, at 155. 
 86. PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM’N, supra note 75, at 2. 
 87. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 231. State regulators should consider how costs are 
affected when considering laws that confine or broaden health care professionals’ scopes of 
practice. Id. at 231-32. “Those in the position to regulate the professional hierarchy in the 
healthcare system ought to seek out resolutions that favor patients’ access to care.” Id. at 234. 
 88. Peter Morrison, Note, Adjusting The Role of Chiropractors in the United States: Why 
Narrowing Chiropractor Scope of Practice Statutes will Protect Patients, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 493, 
533 (2009). 
 89. See id. 
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much trust in doctors.90 Yet, undoubtedly, some state protection is 
necessary.91 
The current approach only considers the professions’ voices in the 
debate at the expense of the public’s interest. Ignoring the perspective 
regarding the long-term effect on the patient’s scope of care can result in a 
narrowed scope of care and a failure to realize the states’ policy goal to 
protect the public’s welfare. Ultimately, this ignorance will lead to a public 
demand for broadened approaches to healthcare treatment options and a 
backlash in response to failed policy considerations as exemplified by the 
legal history of midwifery in the United States. 
III.  LESSONS FROM LEGAL HISTORY: MIDWIFERY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The legal history of midwifery offers an historic example of how licensure 
and scope of practice laws have failed to consider patient scope of care in 
defining who could legally practice child delivery. Doctors used their status 
as a unique holder of complex medical knowledge to dictate the definition 
of delivery as a practice within the scope of medicine and exclude direct-
entry midwives from the practice.92 Claiming that midwives’ approach to 
childbirth was unsafe and posed a threat to the life of the mother and child, 
obstetricians used licensure law to displace direct-entry midwives and 
narrow the scope of care afforded to pregnant women.93 However, the 
movement toward the hospital setting as the best option for the public’s 
safety ignored the long-term effect this change would have on the patient’s 
scope of care and afforded great deference to the healthcare professionals’ 
arguments.94 Omitting the perspective for the patient’s scope of care has led 
to a public demand for a broadened scope of care through the revitalization 
of midwives’ services.95 Today, direct-entry midwives are successfully gaining 
legal recognition and protection of their practice through state law as a 
response to the public’s demand for an alternative to professionalized 
childbirth.96 The shift towards legal recognition suggests that scope of 
practice debates should include a perspective for the long-term effects on 
the patient’s scope of care to enable states to ultimately achieve their public 
policy healthcare goals of protecting the public’s health and welfare. 
 
 90. Stover, supra note 10, at 322. 
 91. Morrison, supra note 88, at 533. 
 92. Stover, supra note 10, at 314, 342. 
 93. Id. at 315-16. 
 94. See id. at 329 (discussing a study in which births in the hospital setting were 
characterized by much higher rates of complicated medical intervention, exacerbating the 
long-term health risks to pregnant women). 
 95. Id. at 317. 
 96. See id. 
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A. Early Practice of Midwifery 
Traditionally, direct-entry midwives relied on self-education in their 
training by observing deliveries attended by experienced midwives and 
completing apprenticeships. Gradually, the midwife would assume a more 
active presence at childbirth.97 Today, this traditional approach is often 
coupled with school training;98 however, it is still distinct from medical-
based training obtained through the discipline of nurse midwifery.99 Nurse 
midwives must earn a nursing degree and then complete additional 
coursework in gynecology and obstetrics before being certified to attend 
deliveries.100 Certified nurse-midwives are authorized to practice in every 
state and can practice in hospital settings under the direct supervision of 
physicians.101 
For almost 250 years, direct-entry midwives were essentially the 
exclusive provider of pregnancy healthcare.102 Pregnant women would call 
in a circle of female family members and friends to attend the childbirth as a 
communal event, and the midwife would offer emotional and practical 
support during the birth.103 Childbirth was a social event, not a medical 
one.104 The midwife’s purpose was to provide emotional and practical 
support to the mother who was in control of delivery herself.105 Midwives’ 
approach viewed pregnancy as normal and part of the woman.106 Childbirth 
was “technologically simplistic.”107 The lack of drugs and surgical 
instruments meant doctors did not have a competitive advantage over 
midwives, and the two professions peacefully co-existed in their practices of 
childbirth.108 In fact, midwives were exempted from the earliest licensing 
laws that threatened legal sanctions for the unlicensed practice of 
medicine.109 
 
 97. Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for 
Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 63, 68-69 (2004). 
 98. Id. at 68-69. 
 99. Stover, supra note 10, at 309. 
 100. Tovino, supra note 97, at 69. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Stover, supra note 10, at 313. 
 103. STARR, supra note 39, at 49. 
 104. Suzanne Hope Suarez, Midwifery is Not the Practice of Medicine, 5 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 315, 325-26 (1993). 
 105. Id. at 331; STARR, supra note 39, at 49. 
 106. Suarez, supra note 104, at 336. 
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 109. STARR, supra note 39, at 45. 
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However, as the medical profession evolved scientifically, doctors 
“[transformed] childbirth into a medical/scientific event.”110 Evolving 
anatomical medical knowledge and the introduction of the forceps, which 
shortened the labor process, initiated the decline of midwives in the late 
1700s.111 Beginning in the 1760s, doctors used their status as holders of 
complex scientific knowledge to convince women that midwives were 
inadequately prepared to handle deliveries.112 Positing there was no such 
thing as a normal pregnancy,113 doctors framed direct-entry midwives as 
posing a serious threat to the safety of the mother and her baby.114 Because 
midwives as a profession lacked political organization and clout, legal 
action to exclude midwives from the practice of childbirth was essentially 
unopposed.115 Following the general public trend toward appreciation for 
physicians’ professional knowledge during the time,116 upper-class women 
accepted physicians’ assertions that they possessed superior ability and skill 
at delivering babies117 and joined the obstetricians’ campaign against 
direct-entry midwives.118 Eventually, all women acquiesced to doctors’ 
desired demand for the “higher standard of obstetrics”119 to “alleviate the 
risks of childbirth.”120 
This framework not only convinced women that obstetricians were better 
qualified for delivery, but also influenced judicial decision-making. Judges 
deferred to state legislatures, who in turn deferred to doctors who articulated 
concern for the mother and child’s safety. In Massachusetts, the court found 
that the Medical Practice Act of 1894,121 which established guidelines for 
examining and licensing doctors and classified obstetrics as medicine, was 
constitutional because “[t]he maintenance of a high standard of professional 
qualifications for physicians is of vital concern to public health.”122 This 
concern for the public’s welfare culminated in the exclusion of midwives 
 
 110. Suarez, supra note 104, at 326. 
 111. STARR, supra note 39, at 49. The first documented obstetric practice was set up in 
1763, marking physicians’ asserted presence in the area of childbirth. Id. 
 112. Suarez, supra note 104, at 326-27. 
 113. Id. at 327. 
 114. STARR, supra note 39, at 223. 
 115. Stover, supra note 10, at 315. 
 116. Suarez, supra note 104, at 326-27; STARR, supra note 39, at 59. 
 117. STARR, supra note 39, at 50. 
 118. Stover, supra note 10, at 315. 
 119. Suarez, supra note 104, at 327. 
 120. Id. at 328. 
 121. An Act to Provide for the Registration of Physicians and Surgeons, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 458, § 1 (1894). 
 122. Tovino, supra note 97, at 81, 103. 
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from licensing protection which would have recognized their profession as a 
legal practice.123 
Underlying doctors’ claims of patient safety concerns was their objection 
to the economic competition midwives posed.124 In Alabama, for example, 
doctors’ efforts to eliminate the practice of midwifery did not intensify until 
midwives began receiving fees for attending childbirths.125 Soon after they 
did, in 1976, the Alabama legislature passed a law making the practice of 
midwifery illegal,126 and as a result, today, there is no legal option for a 
mother to elect a midwife and home birth.127 Similarly, economic 
competition played an important role in doctors’ opposition to midwifery in 
Massachusetts in the early 1900s, which led to legislative action, 
culminating in a ban on home deliveries.128 
Hospital births eventually replaced home births, and obstetricians 
displaced direct-entry midwives. While approximately half of all births in the 
U.S. were midwife attended home births in 1900, by 1950 88% of births 
took place in the hospital, and less than 10% of all deliveries were attended 
by midwives.129 Nurse-midwives became a growing presence in the area of 
obstetrics during the 1930s as the doctor’s subordinate.130 However, these 
professionals offered services to assist doctors and their practice was limited 
by requiring physician supervision.131 The holistic approach of direct-entry 
midwives was abandoned as direct-entry midwives were displaced.132 
In addition to childbirth transitioning to the hospital setting, the 
fundamental protocols of obstetrics also transformed the nature of childbirth 
as doctors, continued to seek improving obstetrician standing within the 
medical profession.133 From a philosophy of responding to problems that 
might present in the process of childbirth, obstetrics evolved to a procedure 
that sought to prevent potential problems through physician involvement.134 
Episiotomies and cesareans transformed labor into a surgical procedure,135 
 
 123. Id. at 104. 
 124. Id. at 101. 
 125. Id. at 75. 
 126. ALA. CODE § 34-19-3 (1976). 
 127. Tovino, supra note 97, at 77-78. 
 128. Id. at 102; See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 80C (2012). 
 129. Tovino, supra note 97, at 67. 
 130. See STARR, supra note 39, at 223. 
 131. Suarez, supra note 104, at 323. 
 132. Id. at 328. 
 133. See Stover, supra note 10, at 315. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Bridget Richardson, The Regulation of Midwifery, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 492 
(2010). 
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and medical preventive measures became the norm.136 Drugs that reduced 
pain during childbirth and induced labor were increasingly administered 
unnecessarily and at the risk of harm to the mother and baby.137 Pregnancy 
came to be viewed as a “condition” with “symptoms” external to the 
mother.138 The dramatic transition to the professionalization of childbirth has 
been explained as 
allopathic physicians . . . have enticed ninety-nine percent of us into their 
places of business (hospitals) for childbirth, forced on us a medical model of 
birth that has never been proven safe or beneficial, raised the price of 
services which have diminished in quality and quantity, and lobbied state 
legislatures for laws that would require [women] to submit to their exclusive 
control during pregnancy and childbirth.139 
B. Re-emerging Midwives & Expanding Patient Scope of Care 
In the 1970s, a general growing distrust of doctors became particularly 
prominent in the feminist movement as women sought an expanded scope 
of care to meet their unique needs.140 Arguing that medicine was sexist and 
had purposefully excluded women, feminists took a proactive role and 
sought an active presence within the profession to change the attitude 
toward and treatment of women from inside the system.141 Women sought 
to demystify medical care and reverse the medicalization of their lives.142 In 
1973, the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe v. Wade,143 and by the 
end of the 1970s, women composed 25% of medical students (up from 9% 
in 1970).144 
This new perspective on medicine and women’s health led women to 
demand the revitalization of direct-entry midwifery.145 Joining women in their 
campaign was the therapeutic counterculture that sought holistic medicine 
as a better alternative to the “technical, disease-oriented, impersonal” 
nature of the existing medical system.146 Advocates of renewing midwifery 
argued that childbirth was not a disease and required neither hospitalization 
nor obstetric medical intervention.147 The grassroots movement was 
 
 136. Stover, supra note 10, at 315. 
 137. Suarez, supra note 104, at 339-40. 
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premised on the desire for natural and prepared childbirth as an alternative 
to the overly medicalized hospital procedure that exclusively controlled 
childbirth.148 The common ground of the movement was a desire to have 
the option of a home birth that could offer personalized, supportive care.149 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists countered such 
demand for alternative delivery options by claiming that lay midwifery was 
“unconscionably risky,”150 and doctors who formed collaborative 
relationships with midwives were threatened with losing hospital 
privileges.151 
The continuous and growing interest by women for the option of a more 
traditional process of childbirth152 has become organized and has earned 
legislative decision-makers’ attention.153 Since the 1970s, the grassroots 
movement has gradually formed professional organizations that are backed 
with money to obtain a political voice on behalf of the public.154 The 
organizations interject the voice of women who are directly impacted by 
obstetrician licensure and scope of practice laws and articulate a preference 
for a more natural approach to childbirth assuming no medical 
complications exist.155 In 1994, in response to the inconsistent regulation of 
direct-entry midwives among states, professional associations of direct-entry 
midwives created a national education and certification agency, the North 
American Registry of Midwives, to certify professional midwives.156 Its goal 
was to standardize licensure and scope of practice requirements so states 
could confidently re-introduce direct-entry midwives into the scope of care 
available to women.157 In response to this social discourse, birthing centers 
across the country have opened, and hospitals are modifying their overly 
medical approach to obstetrics.158 
In Missouri, the law has come to recognize the public demand for 
alternatives to the dominant childbirth procedure as a legitimate policy 
interest.159 In 2007, Missouri passed a bill that included a provision that 
 
 148. Stover, supra note 10, at 316-17. 
 149. Id. at 317. 
 150. STARR, supra note 39, at 392. 
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 152. Stover, supra note 10, at 308. 
 153. Id. at 309. 
 154. Id. at 317. 
 155. See id. at 308-09. 
 156. Id. at 318. 
 157. Stover, supra note 10, at 318. 
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 159. Id. at 309; Current Legislative Events, MO. MIDWIVES ASS’N (2006), http://www.mis 
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“notwithstanding any law to the contrary, [allows] anyone who holds current 
a ministerial or tocological160 certification by an organization accredited by 
the National Organization for Competency Assurance”161 to provide 
“services related to pregnancy (including prenatal, delivery, and post partum 
services).”162 The law answered the demand of Missouri mothers for an 
expanded scope of care during delivery.163 Although doctors protested the 
bill by asserting “‘babies should be delivered in hospitals . . . [as] the safest 
and best practice,’”164 the bill passed both houses and was signed into 
law.165 That same year, doctors filed suit in state court to challenge the 
constitutionality of the provision.166 The circuit court issued a final judgment 
holding the provision unconstitutional under Article III, sections 21 and 23 
of the Missouri Constitution.167 
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the final 
judgment.168 Marking a departure from the typical deference usually 
afforded to the professionals’ perspective, the court found that the plaintiff 
doctors lacked standing to challenge the provision because they had no 
legally protectable interests at stake.169 The plaintiff doctors testified that 
because the practice of medicine includes the provision of pregnancy-
related services, coordinating care with lay midwives who are not licensed to 
practice medicine would expose them to disciplinary action under the new 
law.170 They argued such disciplinary action would have a negative effect on 
their professional reputations and economic livelihood, thus, constituting a 
protectable interest.171 The doctors also argued that they had a protectable 
interest in their patients’ safety and that the midwife provision posed a risk to 
pregnant women who sought the services of these practitioners because they 
could not provide “the care of a licensed and competent physician.”172 The 
 
 160. Tocology is an archaic synonym for obstetrics. THEOPHILUS PARVIN, THE SCIENCE AND 
THE ART OF OBSTETRICS 2 (3d ed. 1895). 
 161. MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1753 (2011). 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6(b)(4)(E)(ii)(I) (2012) (defining the services referenced in the 
Missouri statute). 
 163. See, e.g., Nichole L. Busdieker & Jessica Wilmes, Midwife Bill Lacks Legislative 
Support, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Jan. 8, 2006), http://www.columbiamissourian.com/a/877 
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 165. Mo. State Med. Ass’n v. State, 256 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
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 167. Mo. State Med. Ass’n v. State, No. 07AC-CC00567, 2007 WL 6346842 (Mo. Cir. 
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Supreme Court rejected these overly-familiar assertions, indicating a shift in 
the deferential standard that courts had previously granted to healthcare 
professionals.173 Finding that Section 376.1753 “expressly legalizes the 
services of certified midwives and does so ‘notwithstanding any law to the 
contrary,’” the Missouri Supreme Court held the statute overrode any of the 
disciplinary concerns posited by the plaintiff doctors.174 The limited 
deference afforded to doctors suggests that legal decision-makers are 
starting to recognize and account for the patient’s scope of care perspective. 
However, doctors are not yet done fighting. On February 2, 2012, the 
Missouri State Medical Association circulated a newsletter to inform 
members that the organization is getting ready to “fight” midwives’ lobbying 
efforts to establish their own licensing board to manage their practice.175 
The newsletter champions its organized lobbying efforts to defeat the 
proposal and prevent midwives from threatening the status of the medical 
profession.176 
Studies explain the increased interest and demand for home birth as an 
expression of “privacy concerns, comfort and convenience, decreases in 
medical intervention and exposure to infectious agents, cultural and spiritual 
interests, and desire to remain in control of the environment and process of 
care.”177 Women are interested in exploring their options in childbirth and 
are seeking alternatives to the current option that pressures women into 
medical intervention.178 By licensing both obstetricians and midwives, state 
legislatures are responding to the public’s demand for a broadened scope 
of care.179 The differences in philosophy and attitude toward childbirth 
between obstetricians and midwives give women the choice in alternative 
approaches to childbirth.180 
State law is recognizing that in order to realize its goal of improving 
quality and increasing access, it must consider the patient’s scope of care 
and allow for various, safe approaches to the process of childbirth. 
Obstetricians and midwives’ different angles allow for experimentation and 
multiple points of view from diverse classes of thought.181 The licensure laws 
that reflect the concern for the patient’s scope of care are better informed by 
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including considerations of nonmedical groups and non-healthcare analysts 
who experience healthcare from different perspectives.182 Such insights do 
not threaten the realm of the physician but rather, represent a legitimate 
social action.183 This additional perspective for the patient’s scope of care in 
the debate over licensure and scope of practice laws results in improved 
quality, increased access, and a broad patient scope of care that nurtures 
numerous options for patient treatment.184 
IV.  THE CURRENT DEBATE: PSYCHOLOGISTS’ PRIVILEGE TO PRESCRIBE 
The current scope of practice debate is over whether to expand 
psychologists’ scope of practice to include prescribing psychotropic drugs 
(RxP). The debate is a back and forth between self-interested actors who 
frame their arguments in terms of quality, access, and cost.185 Like the 
history of midwives, this debate presents itself in terms of public policy 
considerations but really only considers the perspective of self-interested 
healthcare professionals.186 The debate is missing an essential perspective 
on how state legislative decision-making will affect the scope of care 
available to mental health patients in the long-term.187 
A. The Context of the Debate 
The current national debate over RxP involves actors across various 
disciplines and originated as an inquiry within the psychology profession 
about its role in prescribing medicine.188 In 1979, a committee within the 
American Psychological Association (APA) made benign recommendations 
relating to psychologists’ role in prescribing certain medications that 
eventually evolved into the APA’s platform to extend psychologists the 
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 186. See infra Part V. 
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authority to prescribe psychotropic drugs.189 In 1995, the APA Council of 
Representatives formally articulated its objective of achieving prescription 
privileges and drafted model legislation.190 The APA has since advocated on 
behalf of the cause.191 In the late 1980s, the advocacy movement moved 
from a national platform to make it a state level issue, where licensure and 
scope of practice is legally controlled.192 In 1985, Hawaii became the first 
state to consider legislation that would have authorized psychologists a 
limited right to prescribe had it not been defeated by the state senate.193 On 
March 5, 2002, the governor of New Mexico signed House Bill 170 into 
law, making New Mexico the first state to expand psychologists’ scope of 
practice to include the power to prescribe medication.194 The law mandates 
specific additional qualifications that must be met in order for a psychologist 
to obtain a conditional prescribing certificate.195 Two years later, on May 6, 
 
 189. Hayes et al., supra note 13, at 698. The committee recommendations were: “1. BPA 
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 193. Id.; HAW. H.J. Res. 159, 99th Cong. (1985); Ronald E. Fox et. al., Prescriptive 
Authority and Psychology: A Status Report, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 257, 257 (2009). 
 194.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-9-17.1 (West 2012); New Mexico Governor Signs Nation’s 
Only Psychologist-Prescribing Law, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1, 1, available at 
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsArticle.aspx?articleid=104459. 
 195. The law allows a psychologist to prescribe if he or she has completed a doctoral 
program in psychology from an accredited institution of higher education; holds a current 
license to practice psychology; has completed pharmacological training (subject to the 
approval of the New Mexico State Board of Psychology Examiners and the New Mexico Board 
of Medical Examiners); has passed a national certification examination (subject to the 
approval of the New Mexico State Board of Psychology Examiners and the New Mexico Board 
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2004, Louisiana became the second state to expand psychologists’ scope of 
practice to include prescribing practices through its enactment of House Bill 
1426.196 Louisiana’s law allows psychologists, who meet certain additional 
training and educational requirements, to prescribe drugs in consultation 
with a patient’s primary physician.197 
In 2011 alone, six states considered bills that would establish a similar 
expanded scope of practice with varying requirements.198 Defeated efforts 
reappear time and again,199 and Missouri has attempted to introduce 
legislation similar to New Mexico’s in 2001,200 2005,201 2006,202 2007,203 
2008,204 and 2009.205 Legislative efforts will likely persist given the 
organized backing of such efforts,206 the increased emphasis on quality, 
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“consultation and collaboration” with patients’ primary physicians (Id. § 37:1360.56). In 
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continuing medical education relevant to the practice of medical psychology. Id. § 
37:1360.65. 
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2260, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S.B. 1400, 26th Leg., (Haw. 2011); S.B. 272, 
62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011); S.B. 2860, 214th Leg., (N.J. 2011); S.B. 228, 76th Leg. 
Assemb. (Or. 2011); H.R. 3523, 76th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2011); S.B. 390, 107th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). 
 199. Oregon psychologists are on their fifth attempt to pass such legislation. See, e.g., 
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access, and cost of healthcare,207 and the predicted increase in access 
issues when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act takes effect in 
2014.208 Therefore, it is important to understand arguments on both sides of 
the debate, various influences that shape the debate, and how the dialogue 
affects legislative decision-making. 
B. The Terms: Quality, Access, and Cost 
Both proponents and opponents of RxP appear to be acting on behalf of 
the public’s best interest by framing their arguments in terms of quality, 
access, and cost.209 Their policy arguments are presented to the public 
through the media210 and to the legislature to inform state actors’ decision-
making.211 The American Society for the Advancement of Pharmacotherapy, 
a division of the APA, is the spearhead for psychologists’ legal authority to 
prescribe.212 The five main reasons asserted in favor of its position are: 
1) psychologists’ education and clinical training better qualify them to 
diagnose and treat mental illness in comparison with primary care 
physicians; 2) the Department of Defense Psychopharmacology 
Demonstration Project (“PDP”) demonstrated non-physician psychologists 
can prescribe psychotropic medications safely; 3) the recommended post-
doctoral training requirements adequately prepare psychologists to 
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Hazard?, ONLINE J. HEALTH & ALLIED SCI., Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 2, 4-5 (stating that “the central 
debate is positioned around the public health impact of prescribing psychologists”). 
 210. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 208; see, e.g., Erica Goode, Psychologists Get 
Prescription Pads and Furor Erupts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002, at F1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/26/science/psychologists-get-prescription-pads-and-furor-
erupts.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Shankar Vedantam, For Psychiatrists, a Bitter Pill in 
New Mexico: Law Giving Psychologists Right to Prescribe Medications Spurs a Battle With 
MDs, WASH. POST, July 1, 2002, at A1. 
 211. E. Mario Marquez, Victory: An Insider’s View of New Mexico’s Legislative Success, 
ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY ADVANCE, Spring 2002, at 1, 13. 
 212. Pollitt, supra note 206, at 490. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
446 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:425 
prescribe safely psychotropic medications; 4) this privilege will increase 
availability of mental healthcare services, especially in rural areas; and 5) 
this privilege will result in an overall reduction in medical expenses, because 
patients will visit only one healthcare provider instead of two — one for 
psychotherapy and one for medication.213 
The American Psychiatric Association is the strongest opponent of RxP.214 Its 
arguments center on the notion that effective prescribing of psychotropic 
drugs requires a requisite education and training psychologists do not 
have.215 
Opponents of psychologists’ prescribing authority, largely psychiatrists, 
articulate their position as a concern for patient safety and mental health 
treatment quality that would result from inadequately trained psychologists 
prescribing drugs.216 They claim that the discrepancy between psychologists’ 
and psychiatrists’ educational and training backgrounds will result in 
suboptimal care that will either not properly treat the illness or lead to an 
adverse harmful outcome.217 Although a limited group of non-physician 
healthcare providers currently prescribe medications (e.g., nurse 
practitioners, physician assistants), critics of RxP argue these healthcare 
providers have a medical background and work closely with physicians; 
whereas, the majority of psychologists do not.218 Opponents lend great 
weight to the value that complex scientific knowledge provides physicians in 
prescribing medicine because psychotropic drugs “present more complex 
drug interactions and adverse effects than any other class of drug”219 and 
50% of patients taking psychotropic medications are on other prescription 
drugs.220 Therefore, prescribers of these types of medication require 
especially intensive training. Opponents of RxP believe the amount of 
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training suggested in proposed legislation is insufficient to prepare 
psychologists to prescribe these medications in a safe and satisfactory 
way221 and that the only way to have sufficient understanding of medicine is 
to attend medical school or graduate nursing school.222 Opponents fear 
that “not knowing what they do not know,” psychologists will expose patients 
to needless risks223 and believe these risks to patients threatens the quality of 
mental health treatment.224 
Conversely, supporters of RxP argue that expanding psychologists’ scope 
of practice will improve quality.225 They posit that psychologists will offer a 
“one stop shop” for individuals who might not have the time or opportunity 
to go to both a psychologist and a medical doctor.226 RxP proponents claim 
this change will improve patient experience by offering a coherent treatment 
plan and preventing delays in treatment that often result from having to see 
two professionals, likely in different locations.227 Supporters assert that their 
prescribing psychologists’ approach will combine assessment, 
psychotherapy, and medication to provide the patient with a more holistic 
approach to mental health treatment than either psychiatrists or general 
practitioners do.228 
In addition to improving quality, advocates of RxP posit that expanding 
psychologists’ scope of practice will increase public access to psychotropic 
treatments.229 This prospect of increased availability played an essential role 
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in New Mexico’s passage of legislation.230 Advocates used New Mexico 
census data showing that 61% of the population lived outside of 
metropolitan areas while only 24% of psychiatrists practiced in those areas 
to argue there was a need for more providers in these areas.231 They also 
argued that RxP legislation would address New Mexico’s issue of having a 
75% higher suicide rate for people between ages fifteen and twenty-four 
than the national average.232 Because 75% of those suicides were 
committed by untreated individuals, advocates posited RxP would reduce the 
high rate by increasing providers.233 The governor and state legislature 
considered access to mental health treatment in underserved areas as 
crucial to passing the law234 and believed that prescribing psychologists 
would practice in these underserved areas to mitigate the state’s existing 
issues.235 Similar arguments echo in other states, as advocates champion 
that RxP will not only address the lack of availability of mental healthcare,236 
but will also increase availability of primary care physicians.237 
RxP opponents argue that the expanded scope of practice will not realize 
goals of creating more providers in rural areas and providing care to 
untreated individuals.238 Data indicating psychologists are no more likely to 
practice in underserved rural areas than psychiatrists239 challenges the 
assertion that expanded scope of practice would address access issues. Even 
if psychologists were more likely to live in underserved areas, critics of RxP 
predict access and lack of treatment issues are not as easily resolved by 
increasing the number of prescribers as supporters of expanding 
psychologists’ scope of practice hope it to be.240 
Opponents believe expanding psychologists’ scope of practice does not 
address many contributing factors to the problem such as the stigma 
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surrounding mental health that prevents people from seeking treatment; 
poverty as a barrier to accessing treatment; and mental illness as a problem 
that requires a case-by-case analysis of what the best course of treatment 
should include.241 Sociological studies reveal the untreated mentally ill 
residing in rural areas are unlikely to seek prescribing psychologists’ services 
even if they were available because the stigma of mental illness leads 
patients to use their primary care physician instead of a mental health 
professional for treatment.242 Further, people in need of mental health 
treatment residing in urban areas go untreated despite the presence of 
numerous providers, suggesting the real problem of limited access to mental 
health treatment and the high rate of untreated mental illness is related to 
the financial situation of the untreated rather than the number of prescribers 
available to treat.243 Thus, legislation granting psychologists prescribing 
authority will not realize the goal of increased treatment for those currently 
untreated.244 Instead of granting psychologists the power to prescribe, 
opponents to proposed legislation posit that the better solution to the mental 
health access issue is collaborative efforts between psychiatrists and primary 
care physicians.245 Both professions are medically trained, and primary care 
physicians are more likely to practice in underserved areas.246 
Finally, supporters and opponents debate how expanding psychologists’ 
scope of practice will impact the cost of mental health treatment. RxP 
proponents believe expanding psychologists’ scope of practice to include 
prescribing drugs will lead to reduced costs to patients for mental health 
treatment by limiting the number of healthcare providers consulted and 
charging lower fees than psychiatrists.247 Opponents are skeptical that costs 
will actually be lower for patients seeing a psychologist for their prescribing 
needs.248 The costs to psychologists of additional education, foregoing work 
to receive additional training, and increased premiums in their professional 
liability insurance249 will likely be reflected in the fees they charge.250 
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C. Debating Self-Interests 
While on the surface the policy considerations appear to act in the 
public’s best interest, they are posited from the perspectives of biased 
actors, who have financial and professional self-interests at stake. RxP will 
affect not only psychologists and psychiatrists’ interests,251 but also other 
professional institutions, such as insurance and pharmaceutical companies 
and educational institutions.252 Advocates and opponents external to either 
profession are incentivized to become active voices in the debate based on 
the potential effects the legislation will have on their industries.253 
Within the field of psychology, professionals are split in their position on 
whether psychologists should have the legal authority to prescribe with each 
side motivated by the effects such legislation will have on their practice.254 In 
one survey, only 55% of APA members supported an initiative that would 
allow appropriately trained psychologists the right to prescribe.255 The 
strongest supporters of RxP are the practice-based organizations, while 
scientist-practitioners oppose the legislative efforts.256 This opposition has 
led to the establishment of the American Association of Applied and 
Preventive Psychology, the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology, the 
Committee Against Medicalizing Psychology, and the Council of University 
Directors of Clinical Psychology.257 These organizations believe that the 
APA’s commitment to pursuing prescribing authority sacrifices the scientific 
and disciplinary values of the profession in favor of medical approaches.258 
The tension within the profession warns that the arguments dressed in terms 
of access, quality, and cost are not as beneficent as they appear.259 
Additionally, practical considerations of putting their practices on hold to 
obtain the additional requirements for prescribing influence practicing 
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psychologists’ opposition.260 On the other hand, students of psychology, 
young psychologists,261 and professional organizations, whose existence is 
longer lasting, have financial and power-based incentives to obtain the 
privilege to prescribe.262 Supporters of RxP present the “one stop shop” 
paradigm as a quality benefit in an effort to push the boundary of 
psychologists’ scope of practice to reach their “final destination” as an 
independent and autonomous practitioner.263 With the authority to prescribe 
medicine, psychologists will be able to receive higher insurance 
reimbursements for treating patients,264 reflecting an “economically-
motivated effort by . . . organized psychology.”265 
Psychiatrists are influenced by their self-serving desire to protect their 
control over the practice of medicine. Because the definition of the practice 
of medicine is broad and overly-inclusive, doctors can modify their practices 
without having to amend their scope of practice.266 They do not risk the 
same legal threats and disciplinary potential for evolutions in their practice 
as other healthcare providers and, therefore, benefit from the status quo.267 
Further, doctors are self-regulated, and although barriers to enter the 
medical profession are high, once licensed, medical doctors essentially hold 
lifetime licensure.268 Allowing overlap of practice between physicians and 
other healthcare providers threatens this security, as well as physician 
autonomy, by opening the door to other professional representation on state 
professional boards.269 Generally, the American Medical Association 
dictates physician opposition to legislative efforts for other healthcare 
professionals’ expanded scopes of practice.270 This default opposition 
undermines the sincerity of psychiatrists’ argument against RxP due to their 
concern for patient safety.271 
Further, psychiatrists’ economic position is threatened if psychologists 
gain the power to prescribe. Insurance companies are likely to reimburse 
 
 260. Hayes et al., supra note 13, at 703. 
 261. Lakhan, supra note 209, at 6. 
 262. Hayes et al., supra note 13, at 705. 
 263. Lakhan, supra note 209, at 5. 
 264. Vedantam, supra note 210, at A6. 
 265. Stephen Barrett, Why Psychologists Should Not be Licensed to Prescribe Psychiatric 
Drugs, QUACKWATCH (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.quackwatch.org/07PoliticalActivities/rxp1. 
html. 
 266. Safriet, supra note 4, at 308. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Holcombe, supra note 31, at 240-41. 
 269. See id. 
 270. Safriet, supra note 4, at 309. 
 271. Long, supra note 216, at 255-56. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
452 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:425 
psychologists’ work at a lower rate than psychiatrists’,272 and psychiatrists 
will be forced to accept similar lowered payments for their practices. These 
economic concerns, along with the historic defiance toward any healthcare 
professional’s attempts at expanded scope of practice273 and their position 
of power (the exclusive authority to practice medicine),274 could certainly 
drive psychiatrists’ stance, putting the patient second to their own self-
interests.275 
In addition to the underlying interests of the healthcare professionals, 
outside self-interested actors are stakeholders in the outcome who infiltrate 
the debate. Stakeholders include “individual providers’ professional groups, 
institutional providers’ professional groups, institutional providers’ 
organizations, employers’ associations, insurance and financing federations, 
specialized consumer advocacy groups, pharmaceutical and medical device 
manufacturers, and legislative and regulatory entities.”276 Independent, for-
profit professional schools and continuing education institutions are a major 
supporter of proposed legislation.277 Elaine LeVine, who has been an active 
presence in advocating for support of legislative efforts to expand 
psychologists’ scope of practice to include prescribing authority,278 is also a 
training director at The Southwestern Institute for the Advancement of 
Psychotherapy.279 Her advocacy for RxP in pursuit of helping people in need 
and unable to obtain help280 becomes questionable in light of her financial 
incentive related to her position at the educational institution that stands to 
profit from such legislation. 
Insurance and pharmaceutical companies also have a lot to gain from 
psychologists obtaining prescribing authority and play an influential role in 
psychologists’ advocacy. With psychologists entering the market of 
prescribing, insurance companies can reduce payments to psychotropic 
drug prescribers and increase profits, as discussed above.281 Pharmaceutical 
companies also see RxP state laws as opening a door to a new group of 
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marketable providers.282 Antidepressant medications were the third highest 
ranked pharmaceutical sold worldwide, and antipsychotic medications 
earned $6.5 billion dollars in 2004.283 Pharmaceuticals’ vested business 
interests overlook the important policy considerations that should be central 
to the debate, namely the public’s best interest.284 
Although both sides of the debate present legitimate policy reasons for 
passing or defeating legislative efforts to expand psychologists’ scope of 
practice, the perspectives that either side considers in formulating its 
arguments are limited and dictated by financial and professional interests at 
stake.285 It boils down to a turf war286 between professions for power and 
status287 at the expense of broader considerations for the patients’ personal 
interests.288 The self-interested actors present legislative decision-makers 
with an incomplete picture. What seems to be missing from the debate is the 
same perspective that was missing when obstetricians took over the practice 
of childbirth: the perspective considering the long-term effects on the 
patient’s scope of care.289 The absence of the perspective for the public 
inhibits realization of the ultimate public policy goal of protecting the public 
welfare. 
V.  APPLYING INSIGHTS FROM THE PAST 
The long-term effects of authorizing psychologists to prescribe 
psychotropic drugs (RxP) will result in a narrowed patient scope of care, and 
hence, will undermine the needs of the very patients these debates are 
purported to serve. The consequences of excluding midwives from licensure 
and scope of practice laws suggest that the current scope of practice debate 
regarding RxP will not achieve the ultimate goals of protecting public 
welfare.290 Rather, expanding psychologists’ scope of practice to include 
prescribing authority will diminish varied models of mental health treatment 
as current approaches converge to limit the spectrum of treatment options 
available to mental health patients and ultimately narrow the patient’s scope 
of care.291 Applying relevant lessons from the history of midwifery suggests 
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that reduced scope of care is not in the patient’s best interest and will 
eventually result in a public demand to return to a broader scope of care. 
Considering the long-term effects of RxP on patient scope of care during 
state legislative decision-making can prevent erosion of effective treatment 
options and potential public health problems and future public backlash. 
A. Implications of Granting Psychologists the Authority to Prescribe 
Psychology offers a different approach to mental illness than psychiatry 
and its methodology allows psychologists to effectively treat patients without 
medical intervention. Since its origins, psychology has evolved as a distinct 
discipline from psychiatry.292 In 1896, Lightner Witmer introduced the term 
“psychology” to the mental health field as a profession that would 
collaborate with physicians in the clinical environment.293 He believed 
psychology was an academic discipline distinct from medicine.294 After 
World War II, the demand and financial incentives to provide mental health 
services pushed psychology towards a “scientist-practitioner” model of 
practice.295 By the 1950s, psychologists redefined themselves as 
psychotherapists and rejected the biomedical disease model of mental 
illness in order to remain distinct from psychiatry.296 Although psychology 
has undergone change over time, psychologists have always offered services 
that are distinguishable from those of prescribing psychiatrists and have 
offered a different approach to mental illness.297 
The fundamental difference between psychology and psychiatry lays in 
the graduate educational training for each profession. Psychologists’ 
orientation is behavioral while psychiatrists’ is medical.298 Psychologists’ 
scientific training is in the areas of behavioral and social sciences while 
psychiatrists’ training is in the medical sciences.299 Ph.D. programs in 
psychology focus on clinical research issues and counseling skills to 
diagnose and treat mental disorders.300 Clinical psychology programs 
include psychopharmacology, neuroanatomy, and physiology classes but do 
not include the foundational, advanced science, and biomedical coursework 
of medical school and psychiatric specialization.301 The focus of 
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psychological training is on scientific knowledge at the psychological level of 
analysis in order to better understand and reduce human suffering.302 
Applying their knowledge to help patients cope with psychological 
distress,303 psychologists offer a “unique contribution” to clinical work in the 
forms of assessment, behavioral programming, analysis, and psychotherapy 
that is distinct from psychiatrists’ approach which has a medical 
foundation.304 Psychologists may avoid psychotropic drugs because they 
believe pills simply permit patients to avoid their emotional pain rather than 
develop the skills necessary to deal with life’s problems, which they believe is 
the ultimate goal of psychotherapy.305 
Predictions regarding the long-term effects of RxP suggest that a 
fundamental change in the educational training of psychologists will be 
required to realize the vision of psychologists obtaining prescribing 
licensure. The minimal amount of additional training needed for 
psychologists to be able to prescribe is equivalent to two years of 
coursework.306 Under New Mexico’s Professional Psychologist Act, 
psychologists must obtain an additional 450 hours of didactic instruction in 
seven core areas of science and pharmacology,307 and under Louisiana’s 
statute, psychologists are required to complete two additional curriculum 
concentration areas in anatomy and biochemistry.308 It is likely that this 
additional psychotropic training will become part of psychology doctoral 
training in an effort to reduce the amount of time in school and to 
encourage all psychologists to obtain prescribing status.309 If the additional 
training were to remain post-doctoral, the duration of training would be 
similar to psychiatry, frustrating cost control goals.310 Further, this additional 
time may deter professionals from pursuing this option.311 As responsibility 
and influence in academia transfers to future generations of prescribing 
psychologists,312 the consequence of prescription privilege training will be a 
“cannibalization of the existing psychology practice base.”313 Doctoral 
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programs will have to restructure their traditional coursework requirements 
to include pharmacological training, which will displace and diminish the 
basic psychological training at the graduate level.314 Eventually, the 
prescribing authority gained will be at “the expense of the broader areas in 
which psychologists contribute knowledge.”315 Curriculum changes in the 
doctoral education will inevitably change skill sets, as well as the type of 
people attracted to and selected into the profession,316 and sacrifice the 
fundamental nature of the profession.317 
This fundamental change in training at the graduate level will result in a 
fundamental change in the profession of psychology at a practical level and 
as a whole. Indeed, the American Association of Applied and Preventive 
Psychology, along with other groups,318 opposes legislative efforts to give 
psychologists the power to prescribe out of concern that this change in 
practice will result in a fundamental change in the discipline.319 Professional 
pressure will push psychologists entering the field towards prescribing 
licensure. Although some psychologists hold they will not pursue the 
prescription privilege if it were available, consumers will undoubtedly have a 
hard time distinguishing between different types of psychologists, resulting in 
confusion.320 To combat the confusion, professional organizations will strive 
to create a more homogeneous profession, which will redefine 
psychology.321 There will be pressure on psychologists to retrain to meet the 
new patient expectations, morphing the current profession into a new 
discipline.322 Prescribing psychologists will supplant non-prescribing 
psychologists by creating a “new breed” of psychologist that will wield 
power and change their presence in the healthcare field.323 The focus on 
prescribing will distance psychology from its traditional biopsychosocial 
model of mental health by advancing a bio-bio-bio model, which more 
closely resembles psychiatry.324 
Not only will the discipline of psychology fundamentally change, but 
scope of practice laws enabling psychologists to prescribe will also have an 
effect on the quality of and access to various mental health treatments as a 
whole. The executive director of the Global Neuroscience Initiative 
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Foundation believes that “the difference between psychologists and 
psychiatrists –– at least how most of the public perceives it –– may soon 
disappear.”325 Insurance companies will opt to cover psychologists, at the 
expense of psychiatrists, eventually driving them out of practice.326 Accepting 
lower reimbursements from managed care organizations than those now 
provided to psychiatrists, psychologists will replace psychiatrists as less 
medically trained drug prescribers.327 Current mental health models will 
converge into one approach that resembles what psychiatry (predominantly 
pharmacological treatment) is today, but perhaps at a lower standard of 
expertise since psychologists will not be required to attend medical 
school.328 Further, the prescribing psychologist will not understand the 
patient as completely as a physician329 and will not be sufficiently trained to 
understand medical complications that may manifest.330 The effect of these 
changes will reduce the array of approaches that currently exist to treat 
mental illness.331 To abandon this approach in pursuit of a more medical 
approach will result in the elimination of an important perspective to a 
multifaceted problem. For example, psychological researchers study various 
psychosocial factors such as family dysfunction, poverty, urban living, 
racism, and child abuse as causal agents of psychosis as opposed to 
triggers or exacerbations of mental illness.332 Threatening access to this 
approach to mental health treatment as psychologists move towards a better 
financially reimbursed medical approach diminishes quality and variety of 
treatment methods. 
B. Scope of Care Should Influence Legislative Decision-Making 
Drawing on lessons from the history of midwifery should inform legal 
decision-making to include the patient’s scope of care as a factor in the 
debate regarding RxP.333 Without considering patient scope of care, state 
 
 325. Id. at 1-2. 
 326. Pollitt, supra note 209, at 523. 
 327. Id. at 521; Vedantam, supra note 210, at 3. 
 328. See Vedantam, supra note 210, at A6 (discussing the Department of Defense 
program that trained ten psychologists to prescribe and although they filled critical needs, 
psychologists and psychiatrists were in “‘unanimous agreement that the graduates were 
weaker medically than psychiatrists.’”). 
 329. Id. 
 330. See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 298, at 70. In an interview, Dr. Paul Applebaum 
cited the example of a recently discovered side effect of liver toxicity for a mood stabilizer 
medication. Vedantam, supra note 210, at A6. He said, “Any physician who gets that letter 
has a framework to fit that information . . . [p]sychologists have none of that.” Id. 
 331. See Bush, supra note 304, at 9. 
 332. John Read, The Bio-Bio-Bio Model of Madness, 18 PSYCHOLOGIST 596, 597 (2005). 
 333. See supra Part III. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
458 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:425 
legislatures will fail to realize the ultimate healthcare policy goals of state 
licensure and scope of practice laws (quality, access, cost). Even if RxP were 
to increase availability of mental health treatment providers, the overall 
medicalization of the specialty will diminish effective psychological 
treatments, and psychiatric models sacrifice quality of and limit access to the 
treatment options currently available. Obstetricians’ medicalization and 
professionalization of child delivery eliminated access to direct-entry 
midwives and resulted in reduced quality of care afforded to the individual 
woman. Obstetricians displaced the holistic philosophy followed by 
midwives with their sterile approach.334 Similarly, the hybrid psychologist will 
displace the psychiatrist as a cheaper alternative prescriber and result in 
decreased access to psychiatrists (as doctors will be less inclined to pursue 
that specialty) and the traditional psychologist whose identity was distinct 
from a psychiatrist’s. The overall consequence will be an abandonment of 
the valuable treatment methodologies each profession offers and a 
narrowed scope of care for patients. 
Just as obstetricians framed the licensure and scope of practice debate 
over delivery from their professional perspective to raise their professional 
status within the medical community, psychologists seek RxP to leverage 
their position within the mental health treatment professional community. 
Framing the issue from professional perspectives reduces the debate to the 
line pushing that scope of practice law enables. As critics of licensure laws 
have warned,335 and as the history of midwifery demonstrates,336 this 
approach places too much emphasis on professionals’ perspectives at the 
expense of the public. The history of midwifery teaches us that ignoring the 
patient’s scope of care in scope of practice debates eventually results in a 
public demand for choice in treatment to fit her individualized 
circumstance.337 
Analyzing and understanding how RxP will affect the access to, models 
of, and quality of mental healthcare offered to the patient is key to realizing 
the healthcare policy goals that state licensure and scope of practice law 
seek to accomplish.338 Psychologists’ “one-stop shop” vision neglects 
consideration of how this fundamental change threatens psychiatry’s 
existence and psychology’s identity.339 Currently, both sides of the debate 
address access concerns in terms of whether proposed scope of practice 
legislation will actually increase the availability of psychotropic drugs to 
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untreated mental health populations.340 Neither considers how RxP will 
affect access in terms of the availability of varied treatment options to the 
patient in the long-term. Current cost control analysis is limited to 
considering whether or not psychologists will charge lower fees.341 It omits 
how those lower fees will impact access to and quality of both psychology 
and psychiatry as varied professional options available to the patient.342 
When the patient’s scope of care is factored into the debate, state 
decision-makers will find the long-term effects of RxP will be narrowed and 
patient scope of care quality lowered. Current mental health treatment 
options (talk therapy, medicine, or a combination) are likely to be replaced 
by a lower quality treatment approach in which psychologists do it all, 
despite not possessing the robust medical educational background of 
psychiatrists and sacrificing several fundamental training components of 
their discipline.343 The “one-stop shop” vision championed by advocates of 
psychologists’ prescribing authority as a way to improve quality and control 
costs will limit overall options available to patients seeking mental health 
treatment to a profession that lacks an identity.344 This echoes how the 
doctors’ concern for the mother’s safety ultimately displaced the holistic 
approach that midwives provided to women who preferred or were better 
served individually by that option.345 Instead of offering their practice as an 
alternative approach to childbirth, obstetricians replaced the midwives’ 
philosophy with a uniform model that characterized pregnancy as a medical 
condition.346 Catering to obstetrician self-interests and advancing a one-
procedure-fits-all model proved to be near-sighted at the expense of the 
patient.347 Similarly, if legislative efforts succeed in extending prescribing 
authority to psychologists, psychologists will replace the several models of 
mental health treatment that currently exist348 and erode psychiatric services. 
Acting to advance their self-interested motives, supporters of RxP threaten 
patient scope of care, the protection of which healthcare policy decision-
making seeks to serve. 
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State decision-makers should no longer allow healthcare professionals 
to define the issue exclusively as “can psychologists safely prescribe” but 
should expand the debate to ask: “should psychologists prescribe in ways to 
advance scope of care.” Limiting the consideration to professional ability 
only, the debate feeds into the notion of a “quick fix” that psychotropic 
drugs can provide and reduces the emphasis placed on psychotherapy and 
psychosocial treatment.349 Quality treatment is not preserved simply because 
medical doctors will possess prescribing medicine as their exclusive turf. 
Rather, quality is maintained because both models of mental health 
treatment will be able to coexist without one winning as superior quality to 
the other. Many psychiatrists and psychologists currently suggest the best 
treatment for mental illness requires a combination of medicine and talk 
therapy or a trial of one after the other.350 Denying psychologists the 
authority to prescribe validates psychology’s methodology and allows 
patients to pursue whichever approach is best suited for them. This broad 
scope of care afforded to the patient will ensure a quality of and access to 
treatment that went missing when obstetricians successfully defined quality 
for childbirth as existing within a hospital’s walls. 
VI.  AVOIDING MYOPIA IN PATIENT SCOPE OF CARE 
The concept of patient scope of care that I derived from an historical 
analysis of midwifery in the United States351 is critical to shaping and 
understanding the current licensure and scope of practice debate 
concerning whether psychologists should be authorized to prescribe 
psychotropic drugs. When consideration of patient scope of care is added 
as a factor in deliberations by state legislatures, it becomes evident that RxP 
may not produce an outcome that is in the public’s best interest. State actors 
must depart from the current approach to healthcare professionals’ 
licensure and scope of practice laws that limit the debate to professionals’ 
perspectives and defers to their medical autonomy.352 Legislators must 
include in their analysis a perspective and concern for the mental health 
patient’s scope of care and the value patients place in a broad variety of 
treatment options. By interjecting scope of care into the debate now, policy 
decision-makers can avoid a future public backlash that will demand a 
higher quality, more accessible, and more complete approach to mental 
health treatment. It will also diffuse the territorial battle between professions 
that has evolved over the historical course of licensure and scope of practice 
laws through legal recognition and appreciation for the value that patients 
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attribute to each profession’s unique contribution to mental health 
treatment. 
As demonstrated by the history of direct-entry midwives’ scope of 
practice, different patients prefer different approaches to pregnancy and 
child delivery. Passing laws that favored one practitioner’s model over 
another was short-sighted and resulted in over-medicalization of childbirth 
and the unavailability of methodologies that some patients desired. By 
adding an element to the debate that considers the long-term effects on the 
patient’s scope of care, legal decision makers have a more robust 
framework in which to consider licensure and scope of practice laws. Policy 
makers can realize that extending the right to prescribe to psychologists is 
not in the best interest of healthcare public policy goals to protect the 
public’s welfare. Enlightened policy will support a variety of models of 
treating mental health to provide the best patient outcome. 
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